- Warnings and responses
- Pearl Harbor | imenbityro.ga
- I. War Memory in the Early Postwar Years (1945 - 1971)
- Pearl Harbor attack
Salem: Ayer Company, Publishers, Inc. Glines tells the story of the Doolittle Raid by describing history but, more importantly, by including first-person narratives from survivors of the raid.
Warnings and responses
He also includes diary entries of members of Doolittle's crew that show the reader what a brief overview of the raid was really shown in the film Pearl Harbor. One of the book's most interesting sources is the transcript from the War Crimes Trial for the Doolittle Raid.
The man being questioned, Chase J. Nielsen, tells exactly what the raiders were instructed to do and the results of their attack. It is particularly notable for revealing the small amount of information members of the military are given about their missions, except for where they will attack and how. Goldstein, Donald M.
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Dillon, eds. New York: Brassey's, This book includes a wealth of primary source materials used by the Japanese in planning the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Numerous writings from Admiral Yamamoto are included, as well as diaries from members of the Japanese navy, which allow the reader to compare the Japanese fighters to their American counterparts portrayed in Pearl Harbor. Papers are also included listing the Japanese use of radio to communicate as well as their code-breaking abilities in regards to American radio communication.
This collection of papers is remarkable because it purely presents the Japanese side of the attack -- a side little seen in Pearl Harbor , the film.
Honan, William H. New York: St. Martin's Press, This book discusses the logistics of how the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. What is most shocking about Honon's thesis is that he argues that Japanese Admiral Yamamoto may not have been as militarily inventive as he appears in most historical records. Honon presents the work of British naval correspondent Hector Bywater as the real source of the ingenuity behind the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. While the film merely brushed over the many challenges the Japanese overcame to attack the secluded Pearl Harbor, Honon gives a detailed description of what exactly happened there and why it was able to happen.
His presentation of Bywater's military tactics is fascinating, particularly because of the great intelligence Yamamoto was credited with after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Also fascinating is the interaction that occurred between FDR and Bywater because the President did not believe Bywater's argument about the great vulnerability of the Pacific to be true.
Landy, Marcia. Wheeler Winston Dixon. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, Landy also gives a synopsis of the film Pearl Harbor as well as summarizing the opinions of most critics toward it, which were largely negative. Landy says that these reviews should be reexamined because they do not ask the questions: "What is it that these narratives of Pearl Harbor expose about the persistence of history and its usefulness to contend with the present?
On what historical resources does the film draw? Layton, U. Admiral Layton was the intelligence officer for the Pacific Fleet during World War II, and he reveals the military secrets of why the Japanese were able to attack the United States with such an element of surprise. He reveals that several important military and government officials knew of the Japanese intentions but did not share them for various reasons.
Admiral Layton shows how high ranking officials misuse their power, particularly how they did not have America's best interests at heart in regards to information about a potential Japanese attack. Admiral Layton also discusses Japan's motivations for the attack -- another subject which is glossed over in the film Pearl Harbor. Melosi, Martin V.
This book highlights the political controversy in the United States after Japan's deafening victory at Pearl Harbor. Melosi discusses how the Roosevelt administration worked to downplay its faults in failing to anticipate such a great attack. Melosi says that the Roosevelt administration did so by focusing their attention, and the country's, on World War II itself, while trying to prevent the public and their Republican critics from blaming the presidential administration for the attack.
Melosi lists the different ways they did this, one of which was blaming the military commanders at Pearl Harbor, General Short and Admiral Kimmel. This book is particularly interesting in light of the great American pride shown immediately after the attack, with President Roosevelt triumphantly standing from his wheelchair to declare that the United States would not be defeated. The political uproar that was felt in America after the attack, detailed by Melosi, is barely hinted at in Pearl Harbor the film. Prange, Gordon W.
Prange presents a virtual anthology of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He discusses every aspect of the attack, particularly focusing on the American intelligence failure in not recognizing the attack. Prange suggests that some of these mistakes may have been deliberate attempts by the U. The only way to describe Prange's book is to say that he provides a nearly scientific examination of every part of the attack, both before, during, and after. Slackman, Michael.
Pearl Harbor | imenbityro.ga
Target: Pearl Harbor. Slackman's book provides one of the most descriptive, minute-by-minute account of the attack of Pearl Harbor available in print. He also lists Japanese motivations for the attack, as well as why the United States was not better prepared. His historical account of the attack itself is by far the best part of this book because his writing about the period before the attack is rather broad.
He also dedicates the last portion of his book to how America reacted to the attack, which is an important part of the history of Pearl Harbor that Pearl Harbor , the film, leaves out.
I. War Memory in the Early Postwar Years (1945 - 1971)
Stinnett, Robert B. New York: Free Press, Stinnett argues that Roosevelt had ample evidence of a planned attack by the Japanese to suspect an attack on Pearl Harbor. Stinnett uses government documents, as well as contact between the government and the military to prove that FDR had a distinct plan for provoking a Japanese attack. Because of the ample evidence Stinnett provides, it is almost impossible to deny at least the possibility that the government knew about Pearl Harbor and could have prevented it.
Stinnett places the bulk of the blame on FDR, who was determined to enter the war and needed an excuse that would rally Americans behind him. Learning about Stinnett's compelling argument causes one to see FDR's speeches in Pearl Harbor in an entirely new light. White, Geoffrey M. The two diplomats were instructed to ensure that an agreement primarily aimed at getting the United States to end its freezing of Japanese assets and back down on its demands that Japanese forces leave China was signed by November Unknown to Nomura and Kurusu, if the agreement was not reached by then, Japan would give orders for Operation Z to proceed.
The deadline was later pushed back to November The United States refused to deal the cards that the Japanese had laid before them, and negotiations appeared to be at an end. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, head of Kido Butai, received orders to put the plan into motion.
Pearl Harbor attack
True to expectations, the naval force sent by Japan toward Southeast Asia was spotted and watched intensely by the Western powers. At the end of November, during this bit of deception, the Kido Butai, consisting of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, and several oilers, all under Admiral Nagumo, sailed undetected northward from Tankan Bay in the Kuriles, heading for Kwajelain and then the Aleutians. The Japanese, for their part, had warned that they would sink any foreign ship they encountered.
The Soviets, in turn, said they would declare war on Japan if the transport, loaded with Lend-Lease goods, were fired upon. If allowed safe passage, however, the Russians promised not to alert anyone to the sightings of a Japanese battle fleet in northern Pacific waters.
The message was then delivered by the captains to the crews of their various ships. A disturbing bit of information then arrived; intelligence reported that none of the five U. Although disappointed, Nagumo did not let the news cause him to cancel or delay the attack. The fact that plenty of battleships and cruisers and destroyers were in harbor was reason enough to proceed as planned. At this point, however, the historic waters get muddy.
Some sources say that it became obvious that Pearl Harbor was the target of an intended Japanese attack and that President Roosevelt and others close to him pretended not to know in order to ensure American involvement in the war, while others say the opposite.